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Conclusion
It is submitted that in Louisiana, pursuant to the Perkins
rule, a defendant may not be cross-examined as to his prior acts
of misconduct for the purposes of impeachment. Cross-examination in this regard is limited solely to prior convictions, and is
governed by R.S. 15:495 and the rules discussed heretofore in
this Comment. Cross-examination as to prior acts of misconduct
not for impeachment purposes, but to prove the crime charged,
are regulated by the rules discussed in the companion article
to this Comment15
W. Michael Adams
THE UNIFORM ACT ON BLOOD TESTS:
DISAVOWAL AND DIVORCE
The Uniform Act on Blood Tests to Determine Paternity'
in Dotson is based upon the admissibility of the rebuttal testimony, not
upon the propriety of the questioning of the defendant on cross-examination.
Later, In State v. St. Amand, 274 So.2d 179 (La. 1973), defendant,
charged with armed robbery, was asked on cross-examination whether or
not he used narcotics. After his denial, the prosecution was permitted to
show that he had stated to the contrary on a prior occasion. A majority
of the court found that the initial questioning was proper because the
state during its case in chief had produced evidence of narcotic paraphernalia found in St. Amand's apartment at the time of his arrest. The court
rejected the defendant's contention that the state was attempting to impeach the defendant on an irrelevant matter because "the evidence of
narcotic paraphernalia found In St. Amand's apartment made the questioning within the scope of that subject." Id. at 192. The court held that
the initial inquiry into defendant's prior narcotics addiction was permissible
because "lilt is almost axiomatic today that most armed robberies are associated with drug addicts trying to obtain funds to sustain their grim appetites. In armed robbery prosecutions, therefore, the subject of drug use by
the accused is relevant." Id. Since the prior drug use of the defendant was
deemed to be relevant and non-collateral, the court reasoned that he could
be "impeached" on the matter.
Again, properly understood, this case appears to involve the application
of the knowledge-intent-system exception to the prior crimes exclusionary
rule in the court's determination of whether the narcotic paraphernalia
found in defendant's room and brought out by the state in its case in chief,
justified questioning the defendant on cross-examination about prior drug
use. Thus, the decision should not be interpreted as standing for the proposition that it is proper impeachment to ask a defendant about prior use of
narcotics.
68. 33 LA. L. REV. 614 (1973).
1. The Uniform Act on Blood Tests to Determine Paternity [hereinafter
cited as UNIFORm ACT] states in part:
"Section 1. Authority for Test. In a civil action, in which paternity
is a relevant fact, the court, upon its own initiative or upon suggestion
made by or on behalf of any person whose blood is involved may, or
upon motion of any party to the action made at a time so as not to delay
the proceedings unduly, shall order the mother, child and alleged father
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was adopted by the National Conference of Commissioners on
Uniform State Laws in 1952.2 The uniform act allows admission
into evidence the results of blood grouping tests,3 and is now
4
in effect in eight states, including Louisiana, and one territory.
The enactment of the statute in Louisiana in 1972 came
sixteen years after the Louisiana supreme court's decision in
Williams v. Williams.5 In that case, a husband sought to disvow
to submit to blood tests. If any party refuses to submit to such tests, the
court may resolve the question of paternity against such party or enforce
its order if the rights of others and the interests of justice so require.
"Section 2. Selection of Experts. The tests shall be made by experts
qualified as examiners of blood types who shall be appointed by the Court.
The experts shall be called by the court as witnesses to testify to their
findings and shall be subject to cross-examination by the parties. Any party
or person at whose suggestion the tests have been ordered may demand
that other experts, qualified as examiners of blood types, perform independent tests under order of court, the results of which may be offered
in evidence. The number and qualifications of such experts shall be determined by the court.
"Section 3. Compensation of Expert Witnesses. The compensation of
each expert witness appointed by the court shall be fixed at a reasonable
amount. It shall be paid as the court shall order. The court may order
that it be paid by the parties in such proportions and at such times as
it shall prescribe, or that the proportion of any party be paid by [insert
name of the proper public authority], and that, after payment by the
parties or [insert name of the public authority] or both, all or part or
none of it be taxed as costs in the action. The fee of an expert witness
called by a party but not appointed by the court shall be paid by the
party calling him but shall not be taxed as costs in the action.
"Section 4. Effect of Test Results. If the court finds that the conclusions of all the experts, as disclosed by the evidence based upon the
tests, are that the alleged father is not the father of the child the question
of paternity shall be resolved accordingly. If the experts disagree in their
findings or conclusions, the question shall be submitted upon all the evidence. If the experts conclude that the blood tests show the possibility
of the alleged father's paternity, admission of this evidence is within the
discretion of the court, depending upon the infrequency of the blood type.
"Section 5. Effect on Presunmption of Legitimacy. The presumption
of legitimacy of a child born during wedlock is overcome if the court finds
that the conclusions of all the experts, as disclosed by the evidence based
upon the tests, show that the husband is not the father of the child."
2. HANDBOOK OF NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF COMMISSIONERS

ON UNIFORM STATE

LAws 185 (1952).
3. UNIFORM ACT § 4.

4. CAL. EVID. CODE § 890-97 (West 1966) (adopted 1953); ILL. REV. STAT.
ch. 106 3/4, §§ 1-7 (1963) (adopted 1957); LA. R.S. 9:396-98 (Supp. 1972)
(adopted 1972); N.H. Rsv. STAT. ANN. H9 522.1-10 (1955) (adopted 1953); OKLA.
STAT. tit. 10, §§ 501-08 (Supp. 1967) (adopted 1967); OE. REV. STAT. §§ 109.25062 (1971) (adopted 1953); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 28, §§ 307.1-11 (1961) (adopted
1961); UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 78-25-18 to 78-25-23 (1955) (adopted 1955); C.Z.
CODE tit. 8, H9 491-97 (1963) (adopted 1963). Michigan once enacted what it
termed the Uniform Act, but it differed substantially from the model act
and was repealed by MICH. STAT. ANN. tit. 27A.9901 (1962). However, blood
tests may be obtained in support cases where the child is born out of wedlock under their paternity act. See MICH. STAT. ANN. tit. 25.491-510 (1957).
5. 230 La. 1, 87 So.2d 707 (1956).
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a child conceived by his wife during the marriage and, in the
same proceedings, sought a divorce on the ground of adultery.
To provide proof for each claim, he requested that blood grouping tests be ordered so that he might be able to disprove his paternity and thereby sustain the burdens of proof for both the action
en desaveu and divorce action. The court, however, refused his
request, holding the restrictive provisions of the Civil Code
dealing with divorce and the action en desaveu do not authorize
the use of blood tests.0 The decision in Williams has been
followed7 although its principle has been criticized in light of
the scientific reliability of such tests. 8
The purpose of this Comment is to determine the possible
effect the adoption of the uniform act will have on the Williams
decision, both in relation to the power of the court to order
blood grouping tests and also to the weight given the results
of such tests. The discussion will also concern the applicable
prescriptive period for each action.
Procedure
The first three sections of the act deal with its general
procedural requirements in relation to the power of courts to
order blood tests and to choose blood test experts. The court
is given the discretion to order blood tests upon its own initiative or upon request of any person whose blood is involved. 9
However, upon motion of any party to the action, the court
must order the tests.10 Provision is further made that if any
party refuses to submit to the tests, the court will have the
discretion to either enforce its order or resolve the question
6. Id. at 7-8, 87 So.2d 709-10; accord, Babineaux v. Pernie-Bailey Drilling
Co., 261 La. 1080, 262 So.2d 328 (1972) (reaffirmed the holding as to action
en desaveu but did note that the evidence would be admissible, although
not conclusive). See also Tannehill v. Tannehill, 261 La. 933, 261 So.2d 619
(1972) (dissenting opinion). Both Tannehill and Babineaux were decided
before the model act was adopted.
7. Babineaux v. Pernie-Bailey Drilling Co., 261 La. 1080, 262 So.2d 328
(1972).
8. The Work of the Louisiana Appellate Courts for the 1956-1957 TermPersons, 17 LA. L. REv. 303, 306, 310 (1957). See generally, C. McCoRMIcK,
Evw]DNcZ § 211 (2d ed. 1972).
9. UNwoRm AcT § 1; LA. R.S. 9:396 (Supp. 1972).
10. UNFORM AcT § 1; State ex rel. Keithline v. Jennings, 436 P.2d 690
(Okla. 1970); McDonald, Blood Grouping Tests--A New Act in Peannsylvania,
33 PA. B. Ass'N Q. 76, 86 (1961).
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of paternity against the party who has refused to submit to
the testing."
The court also has the authority to determine the number,
qualifications, and compensation of the examiners of blood
types.12 Although the court can determine the number of
experts, it has been held that the act envisions more than one
examiner in order that the results of the tests be considered
conclusive. 1
Action En Desaveu
The Louisiana Civil Code provides that the "law considers
the husband of the mother as the father of all children conceived during the marriage."14 Although this presumption has
been called the strongest known in the law,'- the Code does
provide for five instances in which the presumption of legitimacy
may be challenged.'6 Absent these exceptions, this presumption
is conclusive irrespective of any proof to the contrary. This was
made clear by the court in Williams.
An analysis of the appropriate provisions of the act is
necessary in order to determine its effect on Williams, in relation to the admissibility of blood tests and the weight given
such tests. Section four of the act provides that if the experts
are in agreement that the results of the tests reveal that the
11. UNFORM ACT § 1. This should not result in any violation of consti-

tutional rights. Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757 (1966). However, under
the Illinois enactment, if the defendant refuses to submit, his refusal
cannot be revealed at trial. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 106 3/4, § 1 (1963). Illinois
altered the uniform act in this respect.
12. UNIFORM ACT HI 2-3; LA. R.S. 9:397-397.1 (Supp. 1972). In
relation to
the procedure in testing and elimination of error, see S. SCHATKIN, DISPUTED
PATENrrY PROCEEDINGS 131-37, 155-56 (2d ed. 1947); Littell & Sturgeon, Defects
in Discovery & Testing Procedures: Two Problems in the Medicolegal
Application of Blood Grouping Tests, 5 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 629 (1958). It has

been suggested that the qualifications of the blood examiner be determined
by some scientific society such as the American Association of Immunologists, since blood grouping is one branch of this specialty. Perhaps it would
not be quite so suitable to have the experts certified by a medical society
because it might certify only medical men and Ignore the qualifications of
others. Boyd, Protecting the Evidentiary Value of Blood Group Determinations, 16 S. CAL. L. REV. 193 (1943).
13. State v. Sargent, 100 N.H. 29, 118 A.2d 596 (1955).
14. LA. CIv. CODE art. 184.
15. Feazel v. Feazel, 222 La. 113, 62 So.2d 119 (1952).

16. LA. CIrv. CODE arts. 185-90; Comment, 23 LA. L. REV. 759 (1963); Com
ment, 14 LA. L. RPv. 401 (1954); Comment, 13 LA. L. REV. 587 (1953).

17. See notes 5-8 & accompanying text supra.
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alleged father is the child's father, then the court has the discretion to admit the results depending on the infrequency of
blood type. 18 On the other hand, if there is disagreement among
the experts, the issue of paternity shall be submitted upon the
evidence. 19 Furthermore, it is provided that if the experts are
in agreement that the alleged father is not the child's father,
then the question of paternity shall be resolved accordingly.2°
It has been held that this provision deals only with the question
of biological paternity. 21 Where the legal presumption of legitimacy is conclusive, as in Louisiana, it appears this section
alone could not be utilized to overcome it.22 However, if the
presumption is merely rebuttable, then the results of the tests
could be given conclusive weight regardless of the legal pre23
sumption.
Section five of the act provides that "[t]he presumption
of legitimacy of a child born during wedlock is overcome if the
court finds that the conclusions of all the experts . . . show that
the husband is not the father of the child. '24 This provision is
present in only five of the states which have adopted the model
act, including Louisiana. 25 In considering this section, the Pennsylvania supreme court in Commonwealth ex rel. Goldman v.
Goldman2'6 reasoned that with the enactment of the model act
the legislature has added another method by which to rebut
the presumption of legitimacy and allowed the admission of
blood tests results as conclusive evidence. Therefore, if all the
experts are in agreement, the husband may successfully disavow
his wife's child with no other evidence being required.2
18. California, Pennsylvania, and Illinois omit this provision. CAL. Evw.
CODE § 895 (West 1966); ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 106 3/4, § 4 (1963); PA. STAT. ANN.
tit. 28, § 307.4 (1961). Oklahoma expressly excludes it. OKLA. STAT. tit. 10,
§ 504 (Supp. 1967). It should be noted that each expert is to make a separate,
Independent blood analysis.
19. UNIFORM ACT § 4. However, the Illinois Act differs from the model
act in that if the experts disagree, then the results are inadmissible. ILL.
REV. STAT. ch. 106 3/4, § 4 (1963). Oklahoma omits this provision. OKLA. STAT.
tit. 10, § 504 (Supp. 1967).
20. UNIFORM ACT § 4; LA. R.S. 9:397.2 (Supp. 1972).
21. Kusior v. Silver, 54 Cal. 2d 603, 354 P.2d 657, 7 Cal. Rptr. 129 (1960).
22. Id.; CAL. EvIo. CODE § 621 (West 1966).
23. Kusior v. Silver, 54 Cal. 2d 603, 354 P.2d 657, 7 Cal. Rptr. 129 (1960).

24. UNmTORM ACT § 5; LA. R.S. 9:397.3 (Supp. 1972).
25. Pennsylvania, Illinois, Oklahoma, and New Hampshire.

26. 199 Pa. Super. 274, 184 A.2d 351 (1962); Illinois and Oklahoma have
had no cases.
27. Accord, State v. Sargent, 100 N.H. 29, 118 A.2d 596 (1955). In these
states the presumption of legitimacy is not conclusive.
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In the jurisdictions which have not adopted section five,8
only California has considered the question of the presumption
of legitimacy. In California law, there is a presumption that a
child conceived in wedlock is the legitimate child of the husband,
but this presumption may be rebutted by clear and convincing
proof.2 " However, if the child is conceived while the husband
is cohabiting with the child's mother, the presumption is conclusive. 4
The California supreme court considered the applicability
of the model act in Kusior v. Silver.3 1 In that case, a child was
born while the husband was cohabiting with his wife, the child's
mother, but the results of blood grouping tests revealed that
the husband could not have been the father. The court, however,
rejected the use of blood tests, holding that a husband is considered the legal father of his wife's child, when cohabitation
and conception exist during marriage, and that the issue of
biological paternity is therefore irrelevant. 2 The court's refusal
to apply the model act was based upon two grounds. First, the
court reasoned that the deletion of section five in the California
enactment indicated an intention by the legislature to continue
the conclusive presumption. Also, after adoption of the model
act, the Evidence Code provision dealing with this conclusive
presumption was amended to begin "notwithstanding any other
provision of the law."3 3 This amendment, the court felt, further
showed legislative intent not to alter the conclusive presumption
of legitimacy by adoption of the model act. The court, however,
noted that absent cohabitation the presumption is merely rebuttable and the results of blood tests would be given conclusive
weight under section four of the uniform act.
The presumption of legitimacy in Louisiana Civil Code
28. California, Utah, Oregon, and Canal Zone.
29. CAL. EVID. CODE § 661 (West 1966).
30. Id. § 621; Wareham v. Wareham, 195 Cal. App. 2d 64, 15 Cal. Rptr.

465 (1961). Oregon and Canal Zone have the same dual presumptions. ORE.
STAT. § 41.350(6) (1971); ORE. REV. STAT. § 109.070(2) (1971); C.Z. CODE
tit. 5, §§ 3221(5), 3222(31) (1963).
31. 54 Cal. 2d 603, 354 P.2d 657, 7 Cal. Rptr. 129 (1960).
32. Accord, Jackson v. Jackson, 67 Cal. 2d 241, 430 P.2d 289, 60 Cal.
REV.

Rptr. 649 (1967) (allowed results of blood tests when there was cohabitation,
but only if husband could prove that it was impossible for conception to
take place during cohabitation); Louis v. Louis, 7 Cal. App. 3d 851, 86 Cal.
Rptr. 834 (1970); Note, 20 STAN L. REv. 754 (1968).
33. CAL. EvID. CODE § 621 (West 1966).
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article 184 is conclusive8 4 even in the absence of cohabitation.
It is doubtful, however, that Louisiana would follow the California approach in relation to the effect given blood grouping
tests. The California court reasoned that the failure to adopt
section five evidenced a lack of intention to alter the conclusive
presumption. The Louisiana legislature has indicated a contrary
intent by enactment of section five. 5 This intent is further
shown by beginning the blood test statute "[n]otwithstanding
any other provision of law to the contrary."-" Therefore, a
husband should be able to disavow his wife's child even when
the proof required is based solely on the results of blood grouping tests.
Prescriptionfor the Action En Desaveu
The uniform act lacks reference to a particular prescriptive
period in which the husband must commence his suit.37 It seems
probable that the courts would consider the uniform act as an
exception to article 184 and apply the applicable prescriptive
period of article 191 for the action en desaveu. Thus, it would
be necessary for the husband to institute proceedings within six
months after the child's birth if he is in the same parish where
the child is born or within six months after his return.3
34. See note 16 supra.
35. LA. R.S. 9:397.3 (Supp. 1972).
36. LA. R.S. 9:396 (Supp. 1972). In relation to the California approach
see note 33 and accompanying text supra.
37. A situation in which the court barred suit by the husband was
Commonwealth ex rel. Weston v. Weston, 201 Pa. Super. 554, 193 A.2d 782
(1963), where the Pennsylvania court held that when a husband has held
out his wife's child as his own, and conception occurred during cohabitation, he is estopped to deny paternity. On the other hand, the husband may
bring the action at any time if conception did not occur during cohabitation even though the husband held the child out as his own. Commonwealth
ex rel. Carter v. Carter, 43 Pa. D. & C.2d 157 (1967). Subsequent Pennsylvania decisions have incorporated this doctrine of estoppel into the state's
blood test statute, Commonwealth ex rel. Hall v. Hall, 215 Pa. Super. 24,
257 A.2d 269 (1969); Commonwealth v. Phillips, 52 Pa. D. & C.2d 764 (1971),
and although this principle has received criticism, it is firmly established
in that state's jurisprudence. Harris, Some Observations on the Un-Uniform
Act on Blood Tests to Determ4ne Paternity, 9 VILL. L. Rnv. 59 (1963). Absent
such a doctrine, there is no reason why a husband should not be able to
utilize section five of the act at any time. Johnston, Public Policy Considerations in Rulings on the Uniform Act on Blood Tests to Determine
Paternity,4 WM. & MARY L. Rmv. 149 (1963). It is doubtful that Louisiana
would incorporate such a doctrine into the state's statute.
38. Knowledge of the pregnancy is irrelevant in this consideration.
See Feltus v. Feltus, 210 So.2d 388 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1968); The Work of
the Louisiana Appellate Courts for the 1967-1968 Term-Persons, 29 LA. L.
Rzv. 171 (1969).
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Divorce
There are no decisions under the blood test statute where
a party to a divorce action has attempted to prove adultery by
the use of blood grouping tests. 89 Prior to the adoption of the
act, in Williams, Louisiana rejected the use of such tests as proof
of adultery.4 The court concluded that the Civil Code requires
proof of time, place, and correspondent in such an action. The
basis of this holding is questionable because the Code only
states adultery is ground for divorce ;41 evidence of adultery
is merely a question of proof that could easily be sustained by
the use of blood tests.42 The model act does not seem to be so
restrictive as to have application in only an action en desaveu.
The Louisiana act states that it has application "in any civil action
''
in which paternity is a relevant fact, or in an action en desaveu."
(Emphasis added.) This disjunctive language clearly contemplates civil actions beyond that of disavowal, and divorce undoubtedly is a civil action in which paternity is a relevant fact
when the ground would be adultery resulting in the birth of
a child.
Furthermore, the drafters of the model act stated that the
statute would have application "[i]n paternity proceedings,
divorce actions and other types of cases in which the legitimacy
of a child is in issue. '44 (Emphasis added.) It is evident, therefore, that the drafters did intend the use of blood grouping
tests in a divorce action where the ground is adultery and the
legitimacy of a child is put in issue to support the allegation.
Thus, the results of blood grouping tests should be conclusive
evidence to disprove paternity of a child and satisfy the burden
of proof in a divorce action by proving the wife's adultery.
The applicable procedure for the divorce action is similar
to the action en desaveu since in both suits the paternity of
39. It would seem in Oregon that the statute is applicable only to fliation proceedings because of the restrictive language of section one of their
act. 26 ORE. Op. AT'VY GEN. 233 (1954).
40. Williams v. Williams, 230 La. 1, 87 So.2d 707 (1956). See note 5 &
accompanying text supra.
41. LA. CIv. CoDE art. 139(1).
42. The 'Work of the Loutisfna AppeUate Courts for the 1956-1957 TermPersons, 17 LA. L. REV. 303, 306, 310 (1957).
43. LA. R.S. 9:396 (Supp. 1972).
44. HANDBOOK O
NATIONAL
STATE LAWS 434 (1952).
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the child is in issue. If all the experts agree that the husband
could not be the child's father, then the question of paternity
shall be resolved,45 thereby satisfying the burden of proof. Thus
adultery would be proved and the divorce should be granted.
Prescription in a Divorce Action
Since the act has application in a divorce action, the question again arises concerning the issue of prescription. Although
a divorce action may be extinguished by reconciliation, the
action is not subject to a prescriptive period.46 Thus it might
be possible that a situation would arise where the presumption
of legitimacy would be overcome as to the divorce action but
not in relation to the action en desaveu.4 7 The court could incorporate the prescriptive period applicable to the action en desaveu
into the act in every civil action where paternity is at issue.
In such a situation, a husband, absent reconciliation, would
have six months from the date of the child's birth to bring his
divorce action, when he intends to prove adultery by the use
of blood grouping tests.
However, there is no compelling reason to restrict the husband by a prescriptive period. The purpose of prescription in
the action en desaveu is to protect the innocent child from the
legal consequences of illegitimacy. In the divorce action, the
question of legitimacy is at issue only in relation to the evidence
required in order to prove adultery. The child would still be
considered the legitimate child of the husband under the conclusive presumption of article 184 after the prescription for the
action en desaveu has run. Therefore the husband should not
be made to suffer by restricting the evidence available to him
in the divorce action. Absent reconciliation the husband should
be allowed to institute his divorce action at any time, with the
prescriptive period being restricted to six months only when
he wishes to disavow the child in the same proceeding. After
this six month period has run, there should be no bar to his
instituting a divorce action based on the results of blood grouping
tests. 48
Thomas F. Getten
45.
46.
47.
48.
are to

LA. R.S. 9:397.2 (Supp. 1972).
LA. Civ. CoDE art. 154.
Id. art. 191.
It is left to judicial interpretation to determine what other actions
be included in the provision "in any civil action in which paternity

